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22 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director/Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT : NEC Progress Report on the Foreign Intelligence Program

REFERENCE : IAC-D-55/3 (Final), dated 6 February 1953, subject: "The Foreign Intelligence Program"

1. In accordance with your request of 3 June 1953, this Office has reviewed the referenced document.

2. Attached hereto is a recommended revision of Section VI, on Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Please coordinate any changes in this section with [redacted] of this Office.

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H. MARSHALL CHADWELL
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

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VII. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

1. Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSR and Satellites continued to make some progress during the first half of 1953; however, current knowledge is still inadequate in terms of national security needs. There continues to be improvement in the analysis and evaluation of available information, however, the flow of information of a scientific and technical nature from conventional sources is becoming increasingly inadequate. As a consequence, there is an urgent need for the further development and utilization of new and improved methods and techniques for the collection of scientific and technical intelligence information. Efforts along these lines have progressed slowly in the past six months, not withstanding present potential in the fields of noncommunication electromagnetic interception ("noise-listening") and photographic reconnaissance. Consideration is also being given to a reorientation of scientific and technical intelligence towards a greater effort in the overall field of collection.

2. A review of DCID 3/4, allocating primary production responsibilities between CIA and the departments of the Department of Defense and establishing the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC), was scheduled for the first half of 1953. In order to provide more time for an appraisal of the effects of this directive the review was postponed for six months until August 1953.

3. Through detailed studies of Soviet scientific personnel, scientific literature, and improvements in long-range detection techniques, continued improvement has been achieved in knowledge of Soviet accomplishments in the production of fissionable materials which form the basis of the Soviet atomic weapons stockpile. A reasonably good basis has been established for estimates of plutonium production to date and for predicting Soviet capabilities for future expansion in the production of this material. However, the absence of sufficient evidence on which to base conclusions on installed or planned isotope separation capacity for the production of tritium results at the present time, in one of the most important gaps in intelligence on the Soviet atomic energy program. Of equal significance is the lack of evidence in the thermonuclear field. In the face of increasing difficulties in the collection of relevant information, studies in depth of personnel and research activities continue

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toward the selection of additional useful targets offers some hope of further improvement in our knowledge during the forthcoming year. In order to assure the availability of a maximum amount of significant technical intelligence data, the DCI, with the concurrence of the IAC, on 11 April 1953 issued a directive establishing controls for the dissemination of information on the detection of atomic weapons tests within the USSR.

4. Existing scientific and technical intelligence on conventional Soviet armaments continues to be good so far as standardized items in current use are concerned. However, intelligence on weapons and equipments pertaining to the Soviet air offensive and defensive capabilities remains generally inadequate. Information regarding Soviet guided missile programs is also poor, although certain projects based on German developments are becoming increasingly well known. In general, knowledge of key scientists, test facilities, and trends in military research and development remains inadequate as a sound basis for predicting future Soviet weapons and equipment.

5. While the existence of a Soviet CW program has not been positively confirmed, there continue to be indications supporting the belief that such a program does exist. Existence of a Soviet CW program has been confirmed, however, very little additional information related to this program has been received in the past six months. The limited progress obtained in CW intelligence has come from increased utilization of Soviet open literature in related fields. The extreme scarcity of intelligence in both fields offers an opportunity for the Soviets to obtain technological surprise.

6. While some progress has been made in the exploitation of open scientific literature and in research in depth on institutions, knowledge of basic scientific research and development behind the Iron Curtain remains inadequate. Information on Soviet long-range scientific development programs is similarly very poor. Information on the gross quantity of Soviet scientific engineering manpower is reasonably adequate, but estimates of its quality remain less satisfactory. In view of the increasing importance of such basic scientific information to the prediction of future Soviet potential, a concentrated effort to improve intelligence in this field is planned for the coming months.

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